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Article 
Reasonable Men? 
ANN C. MCGINLEY 
After the Supreme Court recognized sexual harassment as a form of sex 
discrimination under Title VII, lower courts used the reasonable person standard 
to measure whether the behavior was sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute 
a hostile working environment.  Cultural and radical feminists objected to the 
reasonable person measure, and many supported a reasonable woman standard, 
which the Ninth Circuit adopted.  Because of its tendency to essentialize how 
women would react, many feminists soon abandoned their support for the 
standard.  A number of circuits, however, continue to use the reasonable woman 
or reasonable victim standards. 
Most of the scholarship concerning the proper standard of reasonableness 
assumes male perpetrators and female victims.  There is no legal scholarship that 
deals with the question of a male victim of a female perpetrator.  A recent Ninth 
Circuit female-on-male harassment case raises important issues concerning the 
reasonable woman standard.  
This Article develops multidimensional masculinities, a new legal theory, to 
reconsider sexual harassment law as it relates to male victims.  Through an 
examination of the recent Ninth Circuit case, it demonstrates that applying a 
reasonable man standard to male victims would establish a preferred standard of 
masculinity that may harm men, women, and society in general.  Most likely, the 
Article proposes, the standard would mimic the concept of “hegemonic 
masculinity,” the most powerful ideal form of masculinity in society.  This ideal 
form of masculinity would judge too harshly those men who may be most 
vulnerable to other-sex and same-sex harassment: men who do not live up to 
gender stereotypes.  
This Article proposes a shift to a new universal standard for determining 
whether workplace behavior is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile 
working environment.  This standard  inquires whether the victim’s response is a 
reasonable one considering not only the various identity factors of the victim, but 
also the workplace, and the social and individual context in which the harassing 
behavior occurs.  
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Reasonable Men? 
ANN C. MCGINLEY
*
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The law in the United States uses the reasonable person standard in a 
variety of disciplines, including constitutional law, torts, criminal law, 
commercial law, and employment discrimination.
1
  Depending on the area 
and the particular case, the standard plays different roles.  In negligence 
                                                                                                                          
* William S. Boyd Professor of Law, Williams S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV. J.D., 1982, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School.  Thank you to Sara McCollum and the Connecticut Law 
Review staff for their excellent work on this Article.  Special thanks to Nancy Levit, Nancy Dowd, 
Elaine Shoben, Jeff Stempel, and Naomi Schoenbaum for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of 
this Article.  Thanks also to Martha Fineman, Frank Rudy Cooper, John Kang, Val Vojdik, Rachel 
Rebouche, Mary Anne Case, Camille Gear Rich, and Noah Zatz for comments on presentations I made 
of this paper.  Jeanne Price, the Director of the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at Boyd School of Law, 
UNLV and David McClure and Chad Schatzle, library professors at the Wiener-Rogers Law Library, 
gave me frequent, excellent and tireless support on this project.  I presented different versions of this 
paper to audiences at the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting in June 2011, the Labor and 
Employment Law Scholars Colloquium in Fall 2011, Suffolk University Law School’s Faculty 
Colloquium in Fall 2011, the University of Florida Workshop on “The Man Question” in Fall 2011, the 
Feminist Legal Theory Collaborative Research Network in Winter 2012, and the University of San 
Diego School of Law Faculty Colloquium in Spring 2012.  I give my heartfelt thanks to the audiences 
of those presentations for all of the help I received on this project.  I also thank Deans John White and 
Nancy Rapoport of the William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV, for their support, both financial and 
professional. 
1 See Mayo Moran, The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual Biography in Comparative 
Perspective, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2010) (discussing the different aspects of the law 
that utilize the reasonable person standard); see also Paula Abrams, The Reasonable Believer: Faith, 
Formalism, and Endorsement of Religion, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1537 (2010) (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s new “reasonable observer” test in determining whether the government had violated 
the Establishment Clause); Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and the Reasonable Person, 14 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 1455, 1457 (2010) (discussing the cultural influences on fact-finders’ views of what 
a “reasonable person” would do when faced with perceived threats); Martha Chamallas, Gaining Some 
Perspective in Tort Law: A New Take on Third-Party Criminal Attack Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 1351, 1352 (2010) (discussing the prominence of the objective “reasonable person” standard in 
tort law); Caroline Forell, What’s Reasonable?: Self-Defense and Mistake in Criminal and Tort Law, 
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1401 (2010) (discussing the use of the “reasonable person” standard in tort 
and criminal law); Susan F. Mandiberg, Reasonable Officers vs. Reasonable Lay Persons in the 
Supreme Court’s Miranda and Fourth Amendment Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1481, 1499 
(2010) (discussing the Court’s differential treatment of police officers and lay persons in determining 
whether they acted as reasonable persons); Michael Vitiello, Defining the Reasonable Person in the 
Criminal Law: Fighting the Lernaean Hydra, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1435 (2010) (discussing the 
“reasonable person” standard in criminal law); Lu-in Wang, Negotiating the Situation: The Reasonable 
Person in Context, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1285, 1286–87 (2010) (discussing the “reasonable 
person” standard in economic transactions). 
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and criminal law, for example, it determines the culpability of the 
defendant, including the availability of a justification or defense.
2
  In Title 
VII law, it has a different purpose: it examines the plaintiff’s story in light 
of community norms to determine whether the defendant’s (or its agent’s) 
alleged behavior creates a hostile working environment.  A plaintiff in 
these cases must prove that the plaintiff subjectively experienced a hostile 
working environment and that the gender or sex-based behavior was 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of 
employment
3
 of a reasonable person.
4
  
Thus, the reasonable person standard in hostile work environment law 
plays a perspectival rather than a culpability-determining function.
5
  Unlike 
in negligence law, where the reasonable person standard measures whether 
the defendant acted tortiously by breaching its duty of care to the plaintiff, 
in employment discrimination hostile work environment law, the 
reasonable person standard analyzes whether the victim’s reaction to the 
environment was reasonable.  While this standard indirectly establishes 
whether the defendant’s alleged behavior is culpable, the primary focus is 
on the alleged victim’s perception of the behavior, and whether a 
reasonable person under the circumstances would have a similar reaction.
6
   
                                                                                                                          
2 Moran, supra note 1, at 1238, 1250.  Where the defense of comparative negligence or 
comparative fault exists, the fact-finder will examine the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s behavior.  
This is different from the perspectival approach in sexual harassment cases because it measures how 
the plaintiff’s behavior contributed to the injury, not whether the plaintiff’s reaction to the behavior 
was reasonable.  More similar to sexual harassment claims are the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress cases where the victim’s response is relevant.  If there is sufficient notice to the defendant 
about a person’s vulnerability to emotional injury, the defendant may be liable for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress.  Where there is an allegation of sexual assault, the plaintiff’s consent to the 
behavior is usually a defense, but inadequate consent will nullify the defense.  There are two parts to 
proving inadequate defense: (1) abnormality of the victim making her unable to consent effectively; 
and (2) notice of the abnormality to the defendant.  See, e.g., Reavis v. Solminski, 551 N.W.2d 528, 
538 (Neb. 1996) (noting the two types of effective consent).  While this latter situation resembles an 
examination of reasonableness in sexual harassment law, it is more similar to an examination of 
unwelcomeness in a sexual harassment case than the reasonableness of the reaction of the plaintiff. 
3 See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (using sexual harassment as an 
example to explain how the abuse must have altered the conditions of employment in order for it to be 
actionable). 
4 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (explaining the application of the 
reasonable person standard). 
5 See Moran, supra note 1, at 1259 (discussing the origins of the perspectival use of the 
reasonable person standard). 
6 Although reasonableness of the plaintiff’s behavior in responding to the defendant’s alleged 
harassment is considered—along with the reasonableness of the employer’s behavior—at a later stage 
if the defendant employer asserts an affirmative defense in a case of supervisor harassment of a 
subordinate, see Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998), that is not the examination of the plaintiff that I am discussing here.  
Rather, I discuss whether a reasonable person would view the behavior as creating a hostile working 
environment itself, not whether the plaintiff could have corrected or avoided the environment if she had 
reported it to her employer. 
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Not all jurisdictions use the reasonable person standard, however.  
After the Supreme Court recognized sexual harassment as a form of 
discrimination under Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
7
 
many lower courts used the reasonable person standard to measure the 
presence of a hostile working environment.
8
  Both cultural and radical 
feminists objected to the reasonable person measure in hostile working 
environment cases,
9
 however, because in their view the reasonable person 
standard was, in reality, based on what a reasonable man would do.
10
  
Cultural feminists argued that the standard did not take into account the 
biological and social differences between women and men; radical 
feminists concluded that the use of a male norm ignored the power 
advantages that men had over women.
11
  These concerns led many 
feminists to support a reasonable woman standard, which the Ninth Circuit 
adopted in Ellison v. Brady.
12
  A number of other courts followed.
13
  But 
feminists soon became dissatisfied with the new reasonable woman test; 
they argued that the reasonable woman standard essentializes women by 
not taking into account the differences among women based on race, class, 
national origin, sexual orientation, and other identity factors.
14
  Some 
                                                                                                                          
7 477 U.S. at 73. 
8 Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 49 
VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1202 (1989) (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986)); 
see also Trotta v. Mobil Oil Corp., 788 F. Supp. 1336, 1350, 1350, n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying the 
reasonable person standard but stating that courts take into account “gender-based differences” in using 
this standard). 
9 Kathryn Abrams, The Reasonable Woman: Sense and Sensibility in Sexual Harassment Law, 
DISSENT, Winter 1995, at 48–49. 
10 See id. at 49 (“Both groups bridled at the possibility that women’s perspectives would be 
described in terms simultaneously applicable to men.”); Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal 
Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 
1404 (1992) (“[T]he standard purports to be universal, to include all ‘mankind,’ and in practice courts 
have applied it to women as well as men.”). 
11 Abrams, supra note 9, at 49. 
12 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).  
13 See, e.g., Gray v. Genlyte Grp., Inc., 289 F.3d 128, 137–38 (1st Cir. 2002) (applying the 
reasonable woman standard under Massachusetts law); Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 
95, 116 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying the reasonable woman standard under New Jersey law); Torres v. 
Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 1997) (using the reasonable woman standard in a Title VII suit); cf. 
Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass’n, 192 F.3d 310, 321 (2d Cir. 1999) (Newman, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (arguing that Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998), 
permits taking into account identity characteristics of the victim).  But see Brennan, 192 F.3d at 318 
(using the reasonable person standard in majority opinion).  
14 See MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN EGALITARIAN 
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD 276–81 (2003) (discussing the evolution of the 
reasonable woman standard and the subsequent challenges to this notion by feminists); Cahn, supra 
note 10, at 1405–06 (noting that feminists also challenged the concept of reasonableness as gendered 
because it is based on rationality and excludes emotion); id. at 1415–17 (noting that the reasonable 
woman standard is problematic because it establishes women as victims, cannot accommodate the 
experiences of all women, and focuses on the victim rather than the actions of the perpetrator). 
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feminists also condemned the standard because they believed that it 
reinforces the view that women are marginal workers by assuming that 
women are different from, and inferior to, men.
15
  Others argued that 
although using a gendered standard may give some victories to women, the 
reasonable woman standard is problematic because it leaves intact a system 
of male privilege.
16
  Another believed that the reasonableness aspect of the 
test would itself preserve male power, and that adding women to the test 
did not resolve the tendency of the test to confirm the status quo.
17
 
All of these debates assume male perpetrators and female victims. 
Subsequently, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
18
 the 
Supreme Court held that male (and presumably, female) victims of same-
sex harassment have a cause of action under Title VII if they prove that the 
harassment is severe or pervasive and occurs “because of . . . sex.”19  
Scholars and courts have paid almost no attention, however, to the 
situation of a male victim of a female coworker’s sexual advances.  
A recent Ninth Circuit female-on-male harassment case, EEOC v. 
Prospect Airport Services, Inc.,
20
 raises important issues concerning the 
standard for female-on-male harassment, and for that matter, male-on-
female and same-sex harassment.  In Prospect Airport Services, a man 
alleged that a female coworker sexually harassed him over a number of 
months, and that their employer did virtually nothing to stop it.  When the 
plaintiff brought suit, the federal district court commented that the plaintiff 
himself had admitted that most men would welcome this type of behavior 
and the court granted summary judgment to the defendant employer.
21
  The 
Ninth Circuit panel reversed, chiding the district court for its attitude 
toward the male defendant.
22
 
                                                                                                                          
15 See Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 469 
(1997) (“As Guido Calabresi and others argue, this asymmetry means that the reasonableness inquiry 
reinforces majority dominance.  Implicitly it posits a norm in which men and majority groups occupy 
the center and others the periphery.” (citing GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE 
LAW: PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 22–23 (1985))). 
16 Stephanie M. Wildman, Ending Male Privilege: Beyond the Reasonable Woman, 98 MICH. L. 
REV. 1797, 1806 (2000) (reviewing CAROLINE A. FORRELL & DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER 
OWN: THE REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN (2000)). 
17 Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in 
Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1218 (1990) (concluding that the reasonable person or 
reasonable woman tests “create a false sense of security . . . reinforcing the idea that legal analysis can 
be neutral and objective”). 
18 523 U.S. 75 (1998).  
19 Id. at 80–81.  
20 621 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2010). 
21 EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., No. 2:05-01125-KJD-GWF, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
72904, at *16, *22 (D. Nev. Sept. 27, 2007), rev’d, 621 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2010). 
22 Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d at 997 (“[T]he district court decision noted that [the 
plaintiff] ‘admits that most men in his circumstances would have ‘welcomed’ [the female coworker’s] 
advances.  But that is a stereotype and welcomeness is inherently subjective . . . .”). 
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While it seems to make sense to consider the identity characteristics of 
the victim in assessing whether a reasonable victim would find the 
harassing behavior severe or pervasive, it also seems odd to hold individual 
male victims to a higher standard than that applied to individual female 
victims.  The reasonable woman standard was established to assure that 
courts and juries would not impose male sensibilities (or the lack thereof) 
on female employees who are alleged victims of sexual harassment in the 
workplace.
23
  When the Ninth Circuit adopted the reasonable woman 
standard in Ellison v. Brady, and other courts followed, courts and 
commentators assumed that sexual harassment victims were exclusively 
women.  For this reason, no one advocating for the reasonable woman 
standard anticipated the standard that would apply to future male victims.
24
  
Because of this failure of forethought, it would be odd to apply a 
reasonable man standard reflexively to a male victim without considering 
the potential repercussions of doing so.  
A major concern about applying a reasonable man standard to male 
victims is that the law would establish a preferred standard of masculinity 
that may harm men, women, and society in general.  Most likely, the 
standard would mimic the concept of “hegemonic masculinity,” the most 
powerful ideal form of masculinity in society.
25
  This ideal form of 
masculinity is often unachievable and would therefore judge too harshly 
those men who may be most vulnerable to other-sex and same-sex 
harassment: men who do not live up to male gender stereotypes.
26
  
Moreover, masculinities research demonstrates that aggressive and 
competitive masculine norms harm not only men but also women who are 
compared to the male standard.
27
 
By the same token, the reasonable woman standard has serious 
drawbacks when assessing harassment of many women: it assumes only 
one proper response from women, but there is no question that different 
women, depending on the myriad axes of their identities, experiences, and 
                                                                                                                          
23 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878–79 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that if the court did not 
take into account the perspective of the victim, the law would reinforce the current levels of 
discrimination, noting a number of sources that demonstrate that women generally react differently 
from men to sexual advances, and adopting the reasonable woman standard to protect female 
employees from harassment and employers from hyper-sensitive employees). 
24 See MORAN, supra note 14, at 276–81 (discussing the literature on sexual harassment, which 
deals exclusively with female victims). 
25 Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame and Silence in the Construction 
of Gender Identity, in FEMINISM & MASCULINITIES 182, 184 (Peter F. Murphy ed., 2004).  For a more 
thorough discussion of masculinities research, see Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities at Work, 83 OR. L. 
REV. 359, 364–78, 380–83 (2004). 
26 See Ann C. McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: Bullying and Harassment “Because of 
Sex,” 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1151, 1163 (2008) (“Our culture . . . exclude[s] men from power who do 
not live up to the normative definition of masculinity.”). 
27 See id. (“Our culture . . . exclude[s] women from power because they lack masculinity . . . .”). 
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the context of the situation, have varying responses to the same harassing 
behavior.  Many of these responses are reasonable. 
Prospect Airport Services raises a number of other questions: whether 
it is possible to have a fair standard that applies uniformly to male-on-
female, female-on-male, and same-sex harassment; whether an objective 
standard should consider identities and experiences of the alleged victims 
together with context of the work situation; and whether the standard 
applied in these cases makes a difference to the outcome.  Prospect Airport 
Services allows us to consider all of these questions.  Because Prospect 
Airport Services features the atypical situation of a man alleging that a 
female co-worker’s behavior created a sexually hostile work environment, 
it is an excellent vehicle for reexamining the standard for determining 
whether a hostile working environment exists under Title VII. 
To be clear, this is not a case comment; the case itself is not that 
important or groundbreaking.  Rather, I use the case because its unusual 
fact pattern allows us to examine a problem in sexual harassment law 
through a different lens and to use the newly acquired perspective to solve 
a legal problem. 
In doing so, I am developing multidimensional masculinities theory 
(“MMT”).  Frank Rudy Cooper and I introduced the concept of MMT and 
coined the term in Masculinities and the Law: A Multidimensional 
Approach.
28 
  Multidimensional masculinities theory is both substantive 
and methodological.  Its theoretical foundations derive from feminist legal 
theory, critical race theory, queer theory, intersectionality theory, and 
multidimensionality theory.
29
  As a substantive matter, MMT combines 
research on masculinities with multidimensionality theory.  
Multidimensional masculinities theory draws on intersectionality theory’s 
insight that persons often have more than one identity that affects their 
treatment.  For example, black women are treated differently than white 
women and black men.  Black women belong to two identity groups that 
are subordinated, and their treatment is not merely the composite of these 
two types of subordination.  The combination of racism and sexism makes 
black women’s experience qualitatively different from that of white 
women or black men.
30
  Multidimensionality theory accepts this premise, 
and additionally explores a person’s identities combined with the context 
of the situation.  It allows us to go beyond the intersections of gender with 
                                                                                                                          
28 Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper, Masculinities, Multidimensionality, and Law: Why 
They Need One Another, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH 1, 1 
(Frank Rudy Cooper  & Ann C. McGinley eds., 2012). 
29 Id. at 2. 
30 See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1243–44 (1991) (explaining that women of 
color are a product of both race and gender and that their experiences do not appear in the discourses of 
feminism or antiracism). 
 2012] REASONABLE MEN? 9 
other identity factors such as race and sexuality, and to consider the 
context in which the behavior occurs.
31
  For example, while black women 
may be members of two subordinated groups and, as a result, may suffer 
more discriminatory treatment in many workplaces than black men,
32
 the 
reverse is true in law enforcement.  Even though black men belong to one 
subordinated group—blacks—and one non-subordinated group—men—
when walking in a dark alley at night and faced with law enforcement, 
black men occupy a worse position than black women.  Black men, unlike 
black women, are considered dangerous, and are often stopped by police 
and/or arrested merely because they are black men.
33
 
As to methodology, MMT enables us to “shift the lens” through which 
we examine the law and its effects.
34
  Ordinarily, we shift the lens by 
examining a case or situation through a different identity category such as 
race or gender.  Prospect Airport Services permits a lens shift to reconsider 
sexual harassment law, a law ordinarily applied to protect women, as it 
relates to male victims.
35
  The lens shift offers a fresh view of the 
stereotypes underlying the behaviors of men and women in the workplace 
and reveals the gendered notions incorporated in the judges’ opinions and 
in the legal standards themselves.  This new perspective provides valuable 
insights that clarify the law’s effects on male and female victims of other-
sex and same-sex harassment, and can lead to the proposal of new theories, 
justifications for, and interpretations of the law.
36
 
                                                                                                                          
31 Athena D. Mutua, The Multidimensional Turn: Revealing Progressive Black Masculinities, in 
MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH, supra note 28, at 78, 83–84. 
32 See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano, A Masculinities Theory Analysis, 33 HARV. 
J.L. & GENDER 581, 603–10 (2010) (explaining the hierarchy of race, class, and gender in fire 
departments); Janice D. Yoder & Patricia Aniakudo, "Outsider Within" the Fire House: Subordination 
and Difference in the Social Interactions of African American Women Firefighters, 11 GENDER & 
SOC'Y 324, 334–36 (1997); Janice D. Yoder & Lynne L. Berendsen, "Outsider Within" the Firehouse: 
African American and White Women Firefighters, 25 PSYCHOL. WOMEN  Q. 27, 30–32 (2001). 
33 See Athena Mutua, The Multidimensional Turn: Revisiting Progressive Black Masculinities, in 
MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH, supra note 28, at 78, 79; Frank 
Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinities: Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity 
Performance and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 853, 875–79 (2006) (describing the myth of the 
“bad black male”). The example of Trayvon Martin who was gunned down while walking home from 
the store in Florida is instructive.  If it is true that he was shot, at least in part, because he was black, it 
seems that it was not only his race that caused his demise.  It was the combination of his race and his 
gender that put him at risk.  See Charles M. Blow, From O.J. to Trayvon, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2012, at 
A17 (detailing the dangers of being a black youth). 
34 See Nancy E. Dowd et al., Feminist Theory Meets Masculinities Theory, in MASCULINITIES 
AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH, supra note 28, at 25, 40 (advocating the use of 
masculinities theory to “shift the lens” to see the law’s assumptions and its effects more clearly). 
35 See EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 2010) (“This is a sexual 
harassment case in which a male employee was a victim of a female co-worker.”). 
36 See NANCY E. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION: MALE SUBORDINATION AND PRIVILEGE 1 (2010) 
(urging feminists to “ask ‘the man question’” to reveal “how gender functions to subordinate some or 
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This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II analyzes the court opinions in 
Prospect Airport Services, explains MMT further, and considers how 
MMT may contribute to an understanding of Title VII sexual harassment 
law.  Part III examines the history of the “reasonable person” and 
“reasonable woman” standards and proposes a shift to a new universal 
standard for determining whether workplace behavior is sufficiently severe 
or pervasive to create a hostile working environment.  This standard, which 
derives in large part from MMT’s focus on context,  inquires whether the 
victim’s response is a reasonable one considering not only the various 
identity factors of the victim, but also the workplace and the social and 
individual context in which the harassing behavior occurs. 
The Article concludes that using MMT to shift the lens in sexual 
harassment cases facilitates the development of a better substantive 
foundation to justify Title VII sexual harassment law regardless of whether 
the perpetrators and the victims are men or women, of different sexes, or of 
the same sex.  An MMT approach leads to the development of a new, more 
universal standard to determine objective and subjective reasonableness 
that takes into account gender, race, and other identity factors in the 
context of organizational and social power, as well as individual 
experiences and vulnerabilities. 
II.  HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENTS AND MULTIDIMENSIONAL 
MASCULINITIES THEORY  
A.  Shifting the Lens:  A Case Study of EEOC v. Prospect Airport Services, 
Inc. 
Rudolpho Lamas began work as a passenger service assistant for 
Prospect Airport Services at McCarran International Airport in Las Vegas, 
Nevada in April 2002, and was soon promoted to lead passenger service 
assistant.
37
  His job was to assist passengers with disabilities by pushing 
them in wheelchairs to the gates.  Lamas, a religious man and a recent 
widower, testified that soon after he began the job, a married female co-
worker, Sylvia Munoz, began to make sexual advances toward him.  Over 
a period of the next few months, Munoz gave Lamas three love notes and a 
partially nude photograph of herself.  Her notes invited a sexual 
relationship with Lamas; one note stated that Munoz was having “crazy 
dreams” about Lamas and Munoz in the bathtub, offered to do a body 
                                                                                                                          
all of most men, as well as how men consciously and unconsciously accept privilege with its patriarchal 
dividend as well as its costs”). 
37 The facts of the case described in this section, EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d 
991 (9th Cir. 2010), are described in the light most favorable to the employee, Lamas, because they are 
recited in response to a motion for summary judgment by the employer.  See id. at 993. 
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massage and stated, “I do want you sexually and romantically!”38 
From the beginning, Lamas told Munoz that he was not interested, and 
he asked her to stop her advances.  He also reported his discomfort on 
many occasions to supervisory personnel at Prospect Airport Services, 
including the Assistant General Manager and the General Manager.  His 
supervisors made some efforts to stop Munoz’s advances; his immediate 
supervisor, Ronda Thompson, and the General Manager, Dennis Mitchell, 
evidently had a meeting with Sylvia Munoz to tell her to stop harassing 
Lamas.
39
  But to no avail.  Munoz continued to solicit Lamas sexually; she 
made comments to him such as “hey, hey” or “whew, whew,” when he 
walked by or licked her lips or simulated a “blow job.”  Once she kissed 
him on the cheek.
40
 
Munoz began to harass Lamas every day, and had co-workers deliver 
messages asking Lamas for dates and stating that Munoz was “going to 
get” Lamas eventually.41  Because of his failure to respond, co-workers 
began to speculate about Lamas’s sexual orientation and they teased him, 
asking if he was gay.
42
 
Lamas testified that he felt “constant pressure” as a result of Munoz’s 
and his other coworkers’ antics.43  Lamas began to see a psychologist about 
his distress; he felt helpless and cried a great deal.
44
  His employer noticed 
a decline in his work.  Months earlier, Prospect had promoted Lamas and 
had assigned him to the Southwest concourse in an attempt to save the 
company’s contract with Southwest Airlines because Prospect considered 
him to be the best performer; now Prospect demoted him.
45
  Finally, in 
June 2003, Prospect Airport Services fired Lamas, citing his poor attitude 
and unwillingness to give quality customer service.
46
 
                                                                                                                          
38 Id. at 994.  
39 See Deposition of Dennis Mitchell at 77–86, Exhibit C to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., No. 2:05-01125-KJD-GWF, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
72904 (D. Nev. Sept. 27, 2007), ECF No. 31-5; Affidavit of Ronda Thompson, Exhibit 8 to Declaration 
of Wilfredo Tungol in Support of Plaintiff EEOC's Opposition to Defendant Prospect's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., No. 2:05-01125-KJD-GWF, ECF No. 50-4, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72904.  
40 Deposition of Rudolpho A. Lamas at 70, 109, 113, Exhibit A to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., No. 2:05-01125-KJD-GWF, ECF Nos. 31-1 to 31-2. 
41 Id. at 44, 50–51, 53, 100–01. 
42 Id. at 167. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 167–68. 
45 Deposition of Dennis Mitchell, supra note 39, at 97–98.  The case brought by the EEOC is 
limited to a hostile work environment claim and does not include a cause of action for his demotion and 
firings in retaliation for reporting harassment.  Deposition of Rudolpho A. Lamas, supra note 40, at 18–
19. 
46 Exhibit 19 to the Deposition of Rudolpho Lamas, Exhibit B to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., No. 2:05-01125-KJD-GWF, ECF No. 31-4, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72904.  In her deposition testimony in this suit, Sylvia Munoz denied many of the 
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Lamas filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that defendant Prospect Airport Services 
had tolerated a sexually hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
47
  In response to the charge, the EEOC 
concluded that Lamas had been subjected to a sexually hostile work 
environment, and it filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Nevada.  After discovery, the defendant filed a motion for 
summary judgment and the federal district court granted the motion.
48
  
Concluding that the behavior failed to create a hostile work environment, 
the district court stated, “Lamas admits that most men in his circumstances 
would have ‘welcomed’ the behavior he alleged was discriminatory, but 
that due to his Christian background he was ‘embarrassed.’”49  By judging 
Lamas’s reaction in comparison to that of “most men,” the court apparently 
equated the “reasonable man’s” reaction to that of “most men in [Lamas’s] 
circumstances.”  In other words, Lamas’s reaction was unreasonable 
because it did not conform to that of “most men.” 
In the alternative, the district court announced that the employer was 
not liable for the harassing behavior because even though the plaintiff 
complained on many occasions to his supervisors, Lamas never filed a 
formal complaint of sexual harassment.
50
  Moreover, the court noted that 
Lamas did not complain further to his employer about the continuing 
harassment after Lamas’s supervisor and the General Manager met with 
Sylvia Munoz to warn her to stop harassing Lamas.
51
  Thus, according to 
the district court, even if the harassing behavior continued to occur, the 
employer was not liable because it had no notice of the alleged acts 
creating the hostile work environment that occurred after the meeting with 
Munoz.
52
  The court, therefore, effectively disregarded Lamas’s testimony 
concerning the harassing acts occurring after the date of the supervisors’ 
meeting with Munoz. 
Lamas’s deposition testimony raised the question of ongoing, 
pervasive behavior by both Sylvia Munoz and their co-workers.  He 
testified that the harassment escalated to daily activities by Munoz and by 
other coworkers, that he complained on numerous occasions to the 
supervisor, his Assistant Manager and the General Manager, and that he 
                                                                                                                          
facts alleged by Rudolph Lamas and claimed that Lamas was interested in a sexual relationship with 
her.  See generally Deposition of Sylvia Munoz, Exhibit D to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., No. 2:05-01125-KJD-GWF, ECF No. 31-6, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 72904. 
47 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
48 Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72904, at *22. 
49 Id. at *16. 
50 Id. at *17. 
51 Id. at *20. 
52 Id. at *20–21. 
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sent a letter to the General Manager complaining about a number of 
problems at work, including continuing harassment.
53
  While the defendant 
testified that there were no further complaints, the court declined to decide 
the factual question but then later drew inferences in favor of the 
defendant’s position.  At that time, the court concluded that Lamas’s letter 
to the General Manager did not refer to continuing harassment—even 
though the letter states, “I still feel harassed in many ways and the past 
problems continue[]”—because the plaintiff’s testimony that he 
complained frequently was not sufficiently specific.
54
   
The district court decision was problematic.  Once Mitchell, the 
General Manager, and Thompson, Lamas’s immediate supervisor, were on 
notice that Munoz was harassing Lamas and that the behavior was 
unwelcome, they should have investigated the situation and remained 
vigilant about further harassment.  It is the employer’s responsibility, once 
it has notice of the harassing behavior, to stop the harassment and promptly 
remedy the situation.
55
 
While the defendant argued below that the employer should not be 
liable because Lamas made no formal sexual harassment complaint to his 
employer, and the district court agreed, the district court’s conclusion is 
clearly wrong.  There is no question that Lamas informed at least three 
company managers on four separate occasions about Munoz’s ongoing 
sexual advances and asked them to correct the situation.  Despite this 
notice, the company made little effort to fix the problem.  The one meeting 
between Lamas’s supervisors and Munoz resulted in little or no change, 
and Munoz continued to harass the plaintiff on a daily basis, as he testified 
at his deposition.  Moreover, as Lamas resisted Munoz’s advances, many 
of their co-workers, at Munoz’s direction, approached Lamas to encourage 
him to take Munoz up on her offers.  Lamas testified that as he continued 
to resist, his co-workers began to ridicule him and question whether he was 
gay.
56
  This evidence, if credited, as the court must do on a motion for 
summary judgment, raises genuine issues of material fact concerning 
whether the employer’s response to Lamas’s complaint was adequate to 
stop and remedy the harassment. 
On appeal, a panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed.
57
  It concluded that “a 
jury could reasonably find that Prospect knew about the harrassment, and 
that its response was inadequate.”58  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit was 
                                                                                                                          
53 Deposition of Rudolpho A. Lamas, supra note 40, at 70–75. 
54 Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72904, at *22. 
55 See id. at *13 (“In order for an employer to be liable for the conduct of an  
employee-coworker . . . the plaintiff must prove that . . . the employer knew or should have known of 
the harassment but did not take adequate steps to address it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
56 EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2010). 
57 Id. at 1001. 
58 Id.  
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critical of the district court’s stereotypes and assumptions about men who 
face sexual harassment at work.  The Ninth Circuit concluded that female 
and male sexual harassment victims should be treated equally, and that 
stereotypes that men desire women to make sexual advances toward them 
have no place in analyzing sexual harassment law.
59
 
Both courts in Prospect Airport Services addressed the substantive 
requirements of a hostile work environment suit  in the context of a man 
who alleges that the behavior of a female co-worker created a hostile 
working environment that altered the terms or conditions of his 
employment.  The hostile work environment law requires that the plaintiff 
prove that the behavior: (1) was unwelcome; (2) occurred because of the 
plaintiff’s sex; and (3) was subjectively and objectively sufficiently severe 
or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of the plaintiff’s 
employment.
60
  Both courts discussed, especially with reference to the 
alleged victim’s status as a man alleging a hostile work environment, the 
unwelcomeness requirement, and the severe or pervasive requirement.  
Neither court discussed the “because of sex” requirement at length. 
1.  EEOC v. Prospect Services, Inc. and Unwelcomeness 
Unwelcomeness is a subjective standard, but in situations where it may 
be ambiguous whether the plaintiff welcomes the behavior of the harasser, 
courts often require some notice to the alleged harasser.  Notice may be as 
simple as saying “no” to invitations or, in some cases, ignoring the 
harasser’s advances.61  There was at least a question of fact whether Lamas 
welcomed Munoz’s behavior.  He testified at his deposition that her 
advances were unwelcome and that he told her to stop on numerous 
occasions.  Moreover, it is undisputed that Lamas told his supervisors at 
least four times about Munoz’s advances and asked that they be stopped.  
The district court noted, however, that Lamas admitted that most men 
would welcome the behavior.
62
  While it appears that the lower court made 
this statement to support its view that Munoz’s behavior did not rise to the 
level of objectively severe or pervasive, the EEOC cleverly argued that the 
district court’s statement revealed its belief that, as a matter of law, the 
behavior was welcome.  On appeal, the EEOC essentially argued that the 
lower court used an objective, rather than a subjective standard of 
                                                                                                                          
59 See id. at 997 (“It cannot be assumed that because a man receives sexual advances from a 
woman that those advances are welcome.”). 
60 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). 
61 See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., (Un)Welcome Conduct and the Sexually Hostile Environment, 53 
ALA. L. REV. 733, 751 (2002) (“[W]here the subject of the harassment either attempts to ignore the 
conduct or declines to specifically address it, the rule seems to leave the default solution—that the 
conduct is not unwelcome—undisturbed.”).  
62 EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., No. 2:05-01125-KJD-GWF, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72904, 
at *16 (D. Nev. Sept. 27, 2007), rev’d, 621 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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unwelcomeness.  The EEOC claimed error because there was significant 
evidence in the record that Lamas did not welcome Munoz’s advances. 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit took its cue from the EEOC and gently 
chided the district court for its discussion of the unwelcomeness 
requirement.
63
  Explaining that unwelcomeness is “inherently subjective,” 
the Ninth Circuit stated that it is irrelevant whether most men would 
welcome sexual advances from a woman.
64
  In a colorful (and perhaps 
unconsciously misogynistic statement), the Ninth Circuit stated: 
It would not make sense to try to treat welcomeness as 
objective, because whether one person welcomes another’s 
sexual proposition depends on the invitee’s individual 
circumstances and feelings.  Title VII is not a beauty contest, 
and even if Munoz looks like Marilyn Monroe, Lamas might 
not want to have sex with her, for all sorts of possible 
reasons.  He might feel that fornication is wrong, and that 
adultery is wrong as is supported by his remark about being a 
Christian.  He might fear her husband.  He might fear a 
sexual harassment complaint or other accusation if her 
feelings about him changed.  He might fear complication in 
his workday.  He might fear that his preoccupation with his 
deceased wife would take any pleasure out of it.  He might 
just not be attracted to her.  He may fear eighteen years of 
child support payments.  He might feel that something was 
mentally off about a woman that sexually aggressive toward 
him.  Some men might feel that chivalry obligates a man to 
say yes, but the law does not.
65
 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that Lamas “unquestionably established a 
genuine issue of fact regarding whether the conduct was welcome.”66  The 
court noted that Lamas testified that Munoz’s advances were unwelcome, 
that they made him cry, that he sought medical help to deal with his 
anxiety caused by her advances, that he had no prior romantic or sexual 
relationship with Munoz, that he never approached her, and that he told her 
that he did not want a relationship with her.  He explained his response by 
referring to the recent death of his wife and his Christian beliefs.
67
 
2.  Severe or Pervasive 
As noted above, Title VII requires that a sexually hostile working 
                                                                                                                          
63 Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d at 998. 
64 Id. at 997. 
65 Id. at 998. 
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
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environment be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or 
conditions of employment.  This standard is both subjective and objective: 
it requires a showing that the individual plaintiff subjectively experienced 
the environment as severe or pervasive and that a reasonable plaintiff 
would similarly so experience the environment.
68
  There is considerable 
debate over what constitutes a “reasonable plaintiff.”  In negligence law, 
some conclude that a “reasonable person” should track the behavior of an 
average person while others argue that a “reasonable person” indicates an 
ideal person in the same exterior circumstances.
69
  In most situations in 
negligence law, the reasonable person standard does not take into account 
the identity factors of the victim but it does consider the surrounding 
circumstances in determining what a reasonable person would do.
70
  In 
employment discrimination law, however, because sexual harassment is a 
tort suffered most commonly by women, and research demonstrates that 
men and women often react differently to harassing behavior,
71
 a number 
of courts consider the identity of the victim in determining whether he or 
she reacted reasonably.
72
 
Noting that the Ninth Circuit has in the past established the 
“reasonable woman” standard in Ellison v. Brady,73 the district court in 
Prospect Airport Services explained that more recent Ninth Circuit cases 
used the “reasonable person with the same fundamental characteristics” 
standard to determine whether a particular environment is objectively 
hostile.
74
  The district court noted that Lamas “admits that most men in his 
circumstances would have welcomed” the woman’s advances and ruled 
that a reasonable jury could not conclude that a reasonable person with the 
                                                                                                                          
68 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993). 
69 See Laura A. Heymann, The Grammar of Trademarks, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1313, 1314 
(2010) (“[T]he law constructs an ideal reasonable person as a standard by which to gauge the propriety 
of a party’s conduct.”); Moran, supra note 1, at 1236 (“[T]he reasonable person . . . is most often the 
common or ordinary man.”). 
70 There are two exceptions in negligence law: (1) a person with a physical disability will be 
expected to act as a reasonable person with the same disability; and (2) a child who is not engaging in 
adult or dangerous activities will be expected to act as a reasonable child would under the 
circumstances.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM §§ 10(a), 11(a) (2010); 
Chamallas, supra note 1, at 1358. 
71 See Barbara A. Gutek & Maureen O’Connor, The Empirical Basis for the Reasonable Woman 
Standard, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 151, 155, 159–63 (1995) (concluding that there are small gender 
differences in reactions to sexual harassment, but also concluding that the reasonable woman standard 
is not helpful); Maureen O’Connor et al., Explaining Sexual Harassment Judgments: Looking Beyond 
Gender of the Rater, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 69, 90–91 (2004) (finding a small differential based on 
the gender of the rater, but concluding that findings of sexual harassment are more complicated than the 
gender of the rater). 
72 See infra notes 119–26 and accompanying text. 
73 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). 
74 EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., No. 2:05-01125-KJD-GWF, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
72904, at *13 (D. Nev. Sept. 27, 2007). 
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same “fundamental characteristics” as the plaintiff would find the 
harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive
75
 to alter the terms or 
conditions of Lamas’s employment.76 
Next, the Ninth Circuit dealt with the question of whether the facts 
evidenced a working environment that was sufficiently severe or pervasive 
from the perspective of “a reasonable victim” to alter the terms or 
conditions of employment.
77
  The court acknowledged that not all romantic 
proposals are illegal sexual harassment, and that merely offensive conduct 
is not sufficient to create a hostile working environment.  Here, the court 
concluded that Munoz’s advances were not severe, but stated that “[t]he 
required level of severity or seriousness varies inversely with the 
pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.”78  Munoz’s repeated advances 
combined with the employer’s failure to stop the conduct led the court to 
conclude that Lamas had presented sufficient evidence to go to the jury on 
the question of severity or pervasiveness. 
3.  Because of Sex 
Because the behavior involved was sexually explicit and the alleged 
harassment occurred between people of different sexes, both the district 
court and the Ninth Circuit assumed that the harassing behavior occurred 
because of Lamas’s sex.  Courts follow a common route in Title VII sexual 
harassment cases.  In male-on-female harassment, courts assume that the 
harasser’s purpose is to engage in a romantic or sexual relationship with 
the alleged victim; they conclude that if the victim were not female, the 
male harasser would not have harassed the victim.  Thus, they conclude, 
the behavior occurred because of sex.
79
 
While in Prospect Airport Services the harasser’s true motives were 
unclear, the facts suggest that the motive was sexual attraction.  Following 
the lead of the male-on-female harassment cases, both the district court and 
the Ninth Circuit assumed that both harasser and victim were heterosexual 
and that Sylvia Munoz would not have harassed Rudolpho Lamas had he 
                                                                                                                          
75 Id. at *13–16.  The court mistakenly uses the term “severe and pervasive,” which is not the 
correct standard, but it seems to consider severity and pervasiveness separately.  The Supreme Court 
has made clear that a hostile work environment exists if it is either severe or pervasive.  Thus, one 
incident, such as a rape or a grabbing of one’s crotch may be sufficient to meet the severity test, but 
absent severity, a work environment can be hostile as a result of pervasive joking, sexual comments, or 
the like.  The less severe the behavior, the more pervasive it should be in order for it to constitute a 
hostile work environment. 
76 Id. at *16. 
77 EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d 991, 1000 (9th Cir. 2010). 
78 Id. (quoting Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
79 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998) (stating that in 
male-female sexual harassment situations when the conduct involves implicit or explicit proposals of 
sexual activity, juries and courts are reasonable to conclude that the proposals would not have been 
made to someone of the same sex). 
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been a woman because her motive was to engage in a sexual relationship 
with him.  Of course, these assumptions ignore the possibility that the 
harasser was bisexual or that Munoz engaged in sexual advances in order 
to ridicule him.  The assumptions also may misunderstand the coworkers’ 
motives in harassing Lamas.  The facts suggest that at least the coworkers’ 
harassment of Lamas was based on Lamas’s failure to live up to gender 
stereotypes of how a “real man” would respond to sexual advances of a 
female coworker.  But under the standard assumptions of the courts, there 
was sufficient evidence that the behavior occurred because of sex for the 
case to go to the jury on this issue.  Whether these standard assumptions 
adequately support a theory of sexual harassment as sex discrimination is a 
different question that I discuss in a separate article.
80
  
B.  Multidimensional Masculinities:  Methodology and Substance 
1.  Theoretical Background 
Masculinities research has recently received attention from feminist 
legal scholars and critical race scholars because it explains why men 
engage in behaviors that are harmful to women and how competitive 
behaviors among men of different races, classes, and sexual orientations 
may also be gendered and may harm both men and women.
81
  
Masculinities theorists use the term “masculinities” in the plural to denote 
that masculinity is not a fixed, natural result of a person’s biological sex.82  
In contrast, masculinities scholars posit that masculinity is socially 
constructed and that men achieve their masculinity through performances, 
or interaction with others (especially other men), and that there are varying 
ways to perform masculinity.
83
 
Masculinities theory recognizes that certain practices we identify as 
“masculine” are normative.  Masculinity prescriptions affect men and 
women of different races, ethnic backgrounds, classes, and sexual 
orientations in different ways.  For many men, defining oneself as 
“masculine” requires proof of two negatives: that one is not feminine or a 
                                                                                                                          
80 Ann C. McGinley, Because of Sex (forthcoming 2013) (on file with author). 
81 See DOWD, supra note 36, at 57–71 (describing the relationship between feminist legal theory 
and masculinities scholarship).  Over the past five years, at least twenty significant masculinities and 
law articles have been published; a comprehensive list of the scholarship regarding law and 
masculinities scholarship through 2009 can be found in Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: 
Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 672–74 & 
n.7 (2009).  See also Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
777, 798–99 (2000); McGinley, supra note 26 (using masculinities theory to analyze workplace 
harassment occurring “because of sex”). 
82 See, e.g., Ethel Spector Person, Masculinities, Plural, 54 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOC. 
1165 (2006) (explaining that masculinity cannot be regarded as a single entity). 
83 See DOWD, supra note 36, at 26. 
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girl, and that one is not gay.
84
  Most men, however, cannot achieve the 
hegemonic masculinity ideal,
85
 and they respond by constantly struggling 
toward achieving the ideal
86
 or by reacting to the ideal by engaging in 
subversive or alternative forms of masculinity.
87
  Whatever form their ideal 
masculinity takes, while men as a group are powerful, individual men see 
themselves as powerless because of the constant competition to prove 
themselves to other men.  Men attempt to gain control, a struggle that is 
rife with fear, shame, and emotional isolation.
88
  These performances are 
homosocial—men engage in them to prove to other men that they are 
masculine.
89
  The performances often involve mistreatment of 
nonconforming men and of women.  These behaviors are particularly 
evident in exclusively male environments or workplaces that are 
traditionally dominated by men.
90
  Men engage in masculine behaviors to 
construct and perform their masculinity at work.
91
   
The term “masculinities” also refers to masculine structures.  In the 
workplace, these structures create barriers to entry and promotion and also 
affect the terms and conditions of employment based on gender, as well as 
race, national origin, class, and other individual characteristics.  Law is a 
masculine structure that creates opportunities for those exhibiting the 
preferred masculinity performances and barriers for those who do not.  The 
federal district court in Prospect Airport Services, for example, interpreted 
legal requirements such as severity or pervasiveness in keeping with social 
attitudes about the proper masculine performance in response to sexual 
advances by women.
92
  This interpretation undermined the plaintiff in this 
                                                                                                                          
84 See id. at 62.  As Kenneth Karst states, “The main demands for positive achievement of 
masculinity arise outside the home, and those demands reinforce the boy’s need to be what his mother 
is not.  In the hierarchical and rigorously competitive society of other boys, one categorical imperative 
outranks all the others: don’t be a girl.”  Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the 
Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 503 (1991). 
85 See Cliff Cheng, Marginalized Masculinities and Hegemonic Masculinity: An Introduction, 1 J. 
MEN’S STUD. 295 (1999); R.W. Connell & James W. Messerschmidt, Hegemonic Masculinity: 
Rethinking the Concept, 19 GENDER & SOC'Y 829, 838 (2005) (discussing ambiguities in the concept of 
hegemonic masculinity and associated embodiments of it). 
86 See Kimmel, supra note 25, at 186–87 (discussing how men seek to prove their manhood to 
other men). 
87 See, e.g., David L. Collinson, ‘Engineering Humor’: Masculinity, Joking and Conflict in Shop-
floor Relations, 9 ORG. STUD. 181, 185 (1988) (observing masculinities displayed by blue collar 
workers in shop culture). 
88 DOWD, supra note 36, at 31; see John M. Kang, The Burdens of Manliness, 33 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 477, 496 (2010) (explaining that “manliness” is forced upon men in the military and that men 
are punished for being shameful and cowardly). 
89 Kimmel, supra note 25, at 186–87. 
90 See McGinley, supra note 26, at 1184 (describing hazing and gang rape in fraternities). 
91 Id. at 1223–24, 1229. 
92 EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., No. 2:05-01125-KJD-GWF, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
72904, at *6 (D. Nev. Sept. 27, 2007) (dismissing the workplace sexual harassment claim of a male 
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case, reinforced other men’s superior masculinity, and set the standard for 
performance of masculinity for “real men.” 
As Cooper and I explain in Masculinities and the Law: A 
Multidimensional Approach, MMT considers how masculinities combine 
with race, sexual orientation, class and gender in different contexts, and 
uses multiple lenses to demonstrate how identity concepts are embedded in 
the law and how the law furthers identity hierarchies.
93
  
Multidimensionality theory (absent masculinities) is rooted in 
intersectionality theory’s insight that unique identities form at the 
intersection of categories of identities.
94
  When combining 
multidimensionality theory with masculinities theory to create MMT, 
Cooper and I rely on two main concepts: (1) identities are co-constituted; 
and (2) identities are context-dependent.
95
  Because identities are co-
constituted, race, gender, class, sexual identity, and other identities are 
inextricably intertwined, and identity is a product and result of these 
relationships.  Moreover, the meaning of co-constituted identities differs 
depending on the settings or the context.  The same individual, for 
example, will discover that different aspects of his identity will be “more 
or less salient over time, in different settings, and depending on what other 
identities are in the mix.”96  Thus, persons with the same combination of 
identities will be treated differently depending on the cultural context.
97
  
Perhaps most important, none of these identities or contexts is fixed or 
static.  Rather, identity performance is just that: a performance that 
changes depending on the context of the situation.
98
  Numerous examples 
abound.  A black man will be treated differently and will react differently 
if he is walking in a white neighborhood on a dark night than if he is going 
to a bar in a predominantly black neighborhood.  A white gay male will be 
treated differently at a gay bar in a gay section of a major U.S. city than if 
he enters a conservative Christian church in the deep South.  And, the 
differential treatment in different contexts will also affect the person’s 
                                                                                                                          
employee against his female co-worker because “most men in [the employee’s] circumstance would 
have ‘welcomed’ the behavior”), rev’d, 621 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2010). 
93 McGinley & Cooper, supra note 28, at 6–7. 
94 See Crenshaw, supra note 30, at 1241–42 (1991) (discussing how recognition of social 
problems, such as battery and rape, as systematic has characterized the political identities of minority 
groups). 
95 See McGinley & Cooper, supra note 28, at 8 (referring to Athena D. Mutua, The 
Multidimensional Turn: Revisiting Progressive Black Masculinities, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: 
A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH 78, 78–79 (Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinley eds., 2012)). 
96 Id. at 8–9. 
97 Id. (citing Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual Support 
Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251 (2002)). 
98 See Devon W. Carbado and Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1268–76 
(2000) (discussing how members of outsider groups must perform their identities in workplaces 
depending on what qualities the culture values).   
 2012] REASONABLE MEN? 21 
behavior in the different contexts. 
This ever-moving concept of identity is, of course, hard to define, but 
it is helpful in understanding workplaces.  Workplaces are dynamic 
locations where organizational power interacts with sociocultural power 
and power derived from interpersonal relationships.  These power 
differentials, in turn, interact with identity performances of individuals that 
change depending on group, context, and culture.  If the law governing 
workplaces remains static, without accommodating these rapidly changing 
differences in understanding of identity and performance within context, it 
will rely on outdated and imperfect notions of human behavior. 
2.  Applying MMT to Prospect Airport Services 
Multidimensional masculinities theory may also help explain 
Rudolpho Lamas’s reaction to Sylvia Munoz and his other coworkers’ 
harassment.  As noted above, masculinities theorists explain that although 
men are powerful as a group, individual men often feel powerless and 
vulnerable as a result of the pressure placed on them for their perceived 
failures to live up to the hegemonic ideal of masculinity.
99
  As a result of 
Munoz’s advances and Lamas’s lack of interest in engaging in a sexual 
relationship with her, other coworkers ridiculed Lamas and questioned his 
sexuality.
100
  Lamas testified that he felt helpless and began crying 
frequently.
101
  What was unusual about Lamas’s response is that he 
admitted his vulnerability to himself, his managers and a psychologist by 
telling them about Munoz’s advances and his negative reactions to them.102  
His employers and the district court compounded these feelings of 
vulnerability by downplaying the importance of his complaints.  These 
feelings of vulnerability result from the necessity to prove one’s 
masculinity continuously, and the fear and shame resulting from a belief 
that one is not a “real man.”  
But Lamas is not only a man.  He also belongs to a number of identity 
groups that, along with the context of the workplace, likely affected his 
response and the behavior of others.  Lamas is a dark-skinned Hispanic, 
fundamentalist Christian man who, at the time of the harassing behavior, 
had been recently widowed.
103
  Lamas was lonely and sad, and he did not 
want to hurt anyone by complaining to management.
104
  This is hardly the 
profile of a typical masculine man.  Even assuming that Munoz was 
initially sexually attracted to Lamas, once he showed his unwillingness to 
                                                                                                                          
99 See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. 
100 EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2010).   
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 998.   
104 Id. at 994. 
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engage in a sexual relationship, Lamas’s superiors and coworkers treated 
him as if he were not a “real man.”  His immediate supervisor, Ronda 
Thompson, never spoke to Munoz about her behavior and the General 
Manager, Dennis Mitchell, did nothing more than tell Munoz that he did 
not want to get involved in a personal situation.  This admonition did not 
stop the harassment.  The Assistant General Manager told Lamas that he 
should sing to himself, “I’m too sexy for my shirt.”105  In other words, 
Lamas should have been flattered by Munoz’s advances.  All signs were 
that Lamas was not acting like a real man.  A real man would have enjoyed 
the sexual advance and taken Munoz up on it.  A real man, even if he did 
not enjoy it, would have handled the situation himself.  He would not have 
complained (“whined”) to his supervisors. 
At Munoz’s encouragement, coworkers urged Lamas to go out with 
her, and when he rebuffed her advances, they turned on him, questioned 
whether he was gay, and questioned his masculinity.
106
  The coworkers’ 
behavior attempted to enforce a gender regime—that a man should accede 
to a woman’s sexual advances, and that if he does not, he is not a real man.  
Their mistreatment of Lamas occurred because of his sex—they pressured 
him to act like a man, and when in their view he did not, they ridiculed him 
for not being a real man.  Although this behavior was not as severe as in 
many cases, it was pervasive and, combined with Munoz’s advances and 
the employer’s refusal to take the complaints seriously, caused Lamas 
harm because of his failure to prove himself a real man. 
Masculinities theory explains why the workplace environment was 
problematic.  It acknowledges that men as a group have power.  But it also 
recognizes that because of the pressure to prove masculinity and the 
competition among men to perform and prove their masculinity, often 
individual men feel powerless.
107
  This feeling of powerlessness appears to 
describe Lamas’s predicament.  Munoz marshaled the power of her 
coworkers and employer to create a situation for Lamas that called into 
question his very manhood.  Given the pressure in society to conform to 
gender roles, this pressure occurred because of Lamas’s sex and his failure 
to live up to stereotypical gender norms of masculinity. 
Prospect Airport Services demonstrates that we need to take into 
account the complicated multidimensional identities of the plaintiff, his 
individual vulnerabilities, his status at work, the workplace context, and 
the location of organizational and social power in determining whether 
Lamas’s reaction was reasonable.  With the facts of Prospect Airport 
Services in mind, the next Part discusses the proper standard for 
                                                                                                                          
105 Id. at 995. 
106 Id. 
107 See DOWD, supra note 36, at 30–31 (describing work by masculinities theorist Michael 
Kimmel). 
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determining whether behavior creates an objectively severe or pervasive 
hostile working environment. 
III.  REASONABLE MAN? WOMAN? PERSON? A REASONABLE RESPONSE 
This Part begins with a short description of the reasonable person 
standard in negligence law and moves to a brief history of the reasonable 
person standard in Title VII.  It then looks to recent Supreme Court cases 
that encourage a contextual approach to Title VII law and adopts a 
multidimensional masculinities analysis of the case study of Prospect 
Airport Services to help determine a fair and workable standard in the Title 
VII context.  It then proposes a new standard for deciding whether a hostile 
working environment exists. 
A.  Brief History of the Reasonable Person:  Negligence and Title VII 
The reasonable person standard, which was the “reasonable man” 
standard in early common law negligence cases, has endured while 
suffering intense criticism.
108
  While it “forms the centerpiece of the 
standard of care in negligence and is at the heart of many of the criminal 
law defenses,” it “is characterized by a lack of clarity about the exact 
nature of the subjective and objective characteristics of the reasonable 
person.”109  Despite significant speculation about whether the “reasonable 
person” represents an ideal or the ordinary or common person, Mayo 
Moran argues that it refers to the common or ordinary man.
110
  The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts of 1965 used the term “reasonable man” to 
define negligence, while the proposed final draft of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts shifted from reasonable man to reasonable person to avoid 
the gendered term.
111
  Martha Chamallas believes, however, that gender 
has once again become invisible because there is no explanation for the 
shift from “reasonable man” to “reasonable person” and younger lawyers 
may be unaware of the gendered history of the term.
112
  The Restatement 
(Third) adheres strictly to the reasonable person standard and permits 
deviance only for children and persons with physical disabilities.
113
  Thus, 
there is little or no room, according to Chamallas, for a perspectival 
approach to the reasonable person standard under the Restatement (Third).  
                                                                                                                          
108 See Moran, supra note 1, at 1235. 
109 Id.  
110 Id. at 1236. 
111 See Chamallas, supra note 1, at 1357 (“[T]he Restatement (Second) used explicitly gendered 
language, defining negligence as the failure to act as a ‘reasonable man under the circumstances’ . . . .  
In contrast to its predecessor, the Restatement (Third) scrupulously uses gender-neutral language 
throughout, relying on inclusive terms such as ‘person’ and ‘actor’.”).  
112 Id. at 1357–58. 
113 Id. at 1358. 
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Certainly, it does not appear that one of the “circumstances” that juries and 
judges should consider in determining whether the person was negligent is 
his or her gender, race, national origin, or other similar identifying 
characteristics.  Nonetheless, Chamallas notes that critical theory has 
argued for varying perspectives in tort law, but the research is complicated 
about how gender affects tort law historically, and points to neither the 
abandonment nor the retention of the reasonable person standard in tort 
law.
114
 
As Chamallas notes, there is slightly more opportunity for a 
perspectival approach in the civil rights cases.
115
  Soon after courts began 
to recognize sexual harassment as a cause of action under Title VII, it was 
clear that courts would reject a unitary subjective standard; feminists 
debated whether the objective test should be of a reasonable woman or a 
reasonable person.
116
  Many argued that because a reasonable person 
merely reflected the experiences of a reasonable man, courts should 
employ a reasonable woman standard so that fact-finders would consider 
women’s experiences in assessing whether a hostile working environment 
existed.
117
  Other feminists disagreed.  They argued that a reasonable 
woman standard essentializes women’s experiences regardless of age, 
disability, race, class, color, and experience.  Thus, the standard would 
become that of the most powerful woman—a reasonable able-bodied white 
woman.
118
 
The Ninth Circuit, in Ellison v. Brady,
119
 adopted the reasonable 
woman (or victim) standard, concluding, “If we only examined whether a 
reasonable person would engage in allegedly harassing conduct, we would 
run the risk of reinforcing the prevailing level of discrimination.  Harassers 
could continue to harass merely because a particular discriminatory 
practice was common, and victims of harassment would have no 
remedy.”120  Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court used the reasonable 
person standard, without explanation, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.
121
  
Although the issue of the proper standard was before the Harris Court in 
amicus briefs, the Court did not refer to the amicus briefs or explain 
whether or not it was rejecting the reasonable woman standard.  It merely 
used the term “reasonable person” in passing.  After Harris, federal courts 
                                                                                                                          
114 Id. at 1371. 
115 Id. at 1354.  
116 See supra notes 7–16 and accompanying text. 
117 See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text. 
118 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
119 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).  
120 Id. at 878. 
121 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (“Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an 
objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find 
hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII's purview.”). 
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of appeals have continued to use a variety of standards, including the 
reasonable person under the circumstances, the reasonable victim, and the 
reasonable woman standard.
122
  The Ninth Circuit sometimes uses a 
reasonable woman standard.
123
  At other times, courts in the Ninth Circuit  
use a “reasonable person with the same fundamental characteristics” or a 
“reasonable person under the circumstances” standard.124  Some courts in 
other circuits have also used the reasonable woman standard.
125
  In mixed 
race and gender cases, a number of courts have held that the standard is 
determined by the race and gender of the individual.
126
 
Mayo Moran emphasizes that the reasonable person standard in sexual 
harassment does not play a culpability-determining function, but rather a 
perspectival function.  She believes that this difference is important, and 
she argues that in the context of sexual harassment, the reasonable person 
standard, as adjusted to consider at least some of the individual 
characteristics of the victim, plays a “corrective” function.127  Because 
most judges are privileged and tend not to have experienced sexual 
harassment from the perspective of the victim, a reasonable woman 
standard, Moran argues, makes the judge think twice about his initial 
reactions.
128
  Moran states: 
                                                                                                                          
122 See supra notes 12–14, 119–21 and accompanying text. 
123 See Alvarado v. Fed. Express Corp., 384 F. App’x 585, 588 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the 
reasonable woman instruction was not erroneous); Manzo v. Laborers Int’l Union of N. Am., 348 F. 
App’x 267, 268 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying the reasonable woman standard); Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 
520 F.3d 1080, 1095 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); Conklin v. City of Reno, No. 3:08-cv-00452-LRH-RAM, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10735, at *7 (D. Nev. Feb. 5, 2010) (same); Spina v. Maricopa Cnty. Dep’t 
Transp., No. CV-05-0712-PHX-SMM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10153, at *7 (D. Ariz. Feb. 5, 2010) 
(same). 
124 Craig v. M & O Agencies, Inc., 496 F.3d 1047, 1055, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (using both the 
reasonable person with the same characteristics as the victim and the reasonable woman standard 
interchangeably); Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995) (using the perspective 
of a reasonable person with the plaintiff’s same fundamental characteristics). 
125 See, e.g., Stephenson v. City of Phila., 293 F. App’x 123, 124 (3d Cir. 2008) (using the 
reasonable woman standard); Williams v. W.D. Sports, N.M., Inc., 497 F.3d 1079, 1089 (10th Cir. 
2007) (same); Ivan v. Cnty. of Middlesex, 595 F. Supp. 2d 425, 450 (D.N.J. 2009) (same when 
applying New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination); Kimber-Anderson v. City of Newark, No. 08-
6309, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19720, at *9 (D.N.J. Feb. 25, 2011) (same); Mitchel v. Holder, No. C08-
00205MEJ, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21088, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2010) (quoting Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998), but replacing the term “person” with “woman” to demonstrate 
that it considered the reasonable person standard to permit an examination of gender). 
126 See, e.g., Caldwell v. Washington, 278 F. App’x 773, 776 (9th Cir. 2008) (using the 
“reasonable African American woman” test); McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (using the “reasonable African-American [wo]man” test); Woods v. Washington, No. C10-
117RSM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5423, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 19, 2011) (using the “reasonable man 
in the plaintiff’s circumstances” test); Picouto v. W. Star Truck Plant Portland LLC, No. CV-08-807-
ST, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95355, at *28 (D. Or. May 27, 2010) (using the “reasonable Hispanic man 
in [the plaintiff’s] position” test). 
127 Moran, supra note 1, at 1273–74. 
128 Id. at 1274.  
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[I]t seems plausible to understand the invocation of the 
reasonable person, with its emphasis on the subjective 
attributes of the individual claiming discrimination, as a kind 
of corrective to the structural inequality that inevitably 
plagues the adjudication of such claims.  If understood in this 
way, a deeper acquaintance with the experience of a 
“reasonable person” in the position of the claimant may well 
be the vehicle to encourage judges to be more reflective 
about the implications of difference and disadvantage in the 
meaning of events and to be accordingly more thoughtful 
about the limits of their own experiences and intuitions in 
such cases.
129
 
Moran notes that the problem with the reasonable person standard, 
without taking individual characteristics into account, is that it defines a 
privileged person, rather than a disadvantaged one.
130
  To the extent that 
the law should use the reasonable person standard to play a corrective 
function with judges who are themselves privileged, it is necessary to look 
at individual characteristics in defining the reasonable person.  The 
concern, Moran concludes, is that if the reasonable person is identified as 
one who has the exact characteristics of the alleged victim, it may appear 
that sexual harassment victims are making a plea for special treatment.
131
  
Moran nonetheless concludes that in the context of cases such as sexual 
harassment, where equality concerns are at issue, the reasonable person 
standard is proper only if it takes into account characteristics of the victim. 
In other words, Moran advocates a reasonable victim or a reasonable 
woman standard.  In so concluding, Moran relies on Kathryn Abrams’s 
approach which views the reasonable victim standard as an opportunity to 
educate the judge and the jury about what it is like for women in the 
workplace.
132
  In this way, the reasonable woman standard encourages the 
fact-finder to take the perspective of the victim and to act as a reasonable 
fact-finder with all of the necessary information.
133
  Abrams claims that 
fact-finders should have four different types of information to assess sexual 
harassment claims: (1) barriers that women have faced and continue to face 
at work; (2) the role that sexualization plays in thwarting women in the 
workplace; (3) the ways in which harassment can cause harm to women in 
the workplace absent severe psychological damage; and (4) women 
workers’ responses to sexual harassment.134  
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134 See Abrams, supra note 9, at 52–54 
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Abrams explains, and I agree, that reasonableness itself is not 
necessarily a problem.  While reasonableness may encourage juries to 
eschew considerations of emotion, a proper reasonableness standard does 
not have to play this role.  Instead, it can guide employers and forestall 
remedies for “pretextual” or “idiosyncratic” responses,135 thereby lending 
greater force and predictability to the law. 
While I agree with Moran and Abrams that fact-finders should 
consider individual characteristics, I have two concerns about their 
analysis.  First, while their proposals take into account identity 
characteristics and context because they talk of the reasonable victim or the 
reasonable woman, they suggest that there is only one reasonable response 
to a particular combination of characteristics and context.  Second, because 
they discuss the typical situation of the reasonable woman, their discussion 
tends to ignore how their proposal would affect male victims of other-sex 
harassment and all same-sex victims.  My view is that only if we can find a 
workable standard for all types of victims will women—the most common 
victims of sexual harassment—be fully protected.  Moran, Abrams, and 
other feminist scholars’ exclusive focus on women as victims ignores the 
blind spots that many have regarding gender norms.  For example, 
Abrams’s list of four types of information specifically deals with women’s 
newcomer status in the workplace and the difficulty that women have in 
the traditionally male environment of the workplace.  These types of 
information would not help a judge or jury to understand how male victims 
in the workplace may suffer from the imposition of norms of masculinity. 
Masculinities theories, however, may help judges and juries to 
understand why certain men are vulnerable to harassment by coworkers or 
supervisors.  Male and some female coworkers harass gender 
nonconforming men for their failure to live up to masculinity norms.
136
  
These masculinity norms hurt not only the men who are judged by the 
norms.  They often exclude women from the workplace or result in their 
harassment as well.  Moreover, harassment based on masculinity norms is 
often invisible to men.
137
  Thus, if judges (especially male judges) attempt 
to use their own “common sense” or to allow the juries to use “common 
sense” without permitting expert testimony on social facts concerning 
gender norms, they may actually reinforce the very gender norms that 
cause the harassment.  Judges should permit expert testimony to explain to 
                                                                                                                          
135 Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 
VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1210 (1989). 
136 See Margaret S. Stockdale et al., Perceptions of the Sexual Harassment of Men, 5 PSYCHOL. 
MEN & MASCULINITY 158, 164 (2004) (finding that men, as well as women who supported 
hypermasculinity, were less likely than others to view certain workplace behaviors as sexual 
harassment). 
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the fact-finders  how groups enforce gender norms at work (in the context 
of the case before the jury).  This evidence differs from the social 
frameworks evidence rejected by the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Dukes.
138
  Social frameworks evidence is the application of expert 
testimony to a case for background and giving an opinion as to the 
relevance of the social science evidence to the case at issue.  Unlike the 
social frameworks evidence condemned by the Court in Wal-Mart, social 
facts evidence uses the same scientific principles used by scientists outside 
of the litigation process.  Professors Mitchell, Walker, and Monahan 
explain social facts evidence: 
[T]he expert applies scientific principles and methods to 
case-specific data in the same way that the expert would use 
scientific principles and methods to analyze data outside the 
litigation context.  When social scientific principles and 
methods are used to develop opinions about the parties, 
practices, or behaviors involved in a particular case, such 
evidence has been referred to as “social facts.”139 
This social facts evidence is admissible as adjudicative fact and will 
help jurors to make their decisions using social science data rather than 
mere common sense.
140
 
Another problem of the proposed standards is that they create a 
monolithic picture of the reasonable woman (or man, or person) and 
assume that there is only one reasonable way to respond to a set of 
harassing circumstances.
141
  While in negligence law it may make sense to 
describe what a reasonable person should do in order to avoid harming 
others or oneself, it is odd to assume that there is only one reasonable 
reaction to others’ potentially discriminatory behavior.  Moreover, many 
factors, among them identity factors and context, will influence how 
different people respond to similar behavior.  Many of these varying 
                                                                                                                          
138 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011). 
139 Gregory Mitchell et al., Beyond Context: Social Facts as Case-Specific Evidence, 60 EMORY 
L.J. 1109, 1113 (2011) (citation omitted) (distinguishing social facts evidence from social framework 
evidence and arguing that social facts evidence should be admissible as adjudicative fact).  
140 See id. at 1117–18 (explaining that social facts differ from social authority and social 
frameworks in two respects: “(1) social facts involve case-specific descriptive or causal claims, 
whereas social authority and social frameworks involve general propositions about causation or about 
the prevalence of certain behaviors, characteristics, or outcomes in the aggregate; and (2) because 
social facts involve case-specific claims, social facts require the application of sound methods and 
principles to case-specific data to reach descriptive and causal conclusions about the case at hand.”). 
141 In the Ninth Circuit, for example, some panels use the reasonable woman standard while 
others use a reasonable person under the circumstances standard.  Still others use the reasonable person 
with the same fundamental characteristics standards.  Other courts of appeals use the reasonable person 
under the circumstances or the reasonable victim standard.  See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying 
text. 
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responses are reasonable. 
B.  Context Matters 
In cases decided after Harris, moreover, the Supreme Court has hinted 
at a broader standard and has advocated the consideration of context, a 
context that may include the victim’s identity.142  In a number of recent 
Title VII cases, the Court has emphasized the importance of context in 
determining whether a violation has occurred.
143
  This acknowledgement 
that “context matters” suggests that the Court’s “reasonable person” 
standard in Harris may permit consideration of the victim’s identity as one 
factor among many in determining whether the victim’s reaction was 
reasonable.  Certainly, the Court encourages an understanding of context, 
which multidimensional masculinities theory would also encourage.       
For example, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
144
 the 
Court expressly noted the importance of context in determining whether 
the behavior is actionable; it contrasted the situation of a football coach 
who pats his player on the buttocks for encouragement as he goes out onto 
the field (which is not sexual harassment) with a coach who pats his female 
secretary’s buttocks (which is likely sexual harassment).145  The same 
behavior, given the context and the identity of the potential victim, will 
likely have different legal effect.  The Court states that “[t]he real social 
impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of 
surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not 
fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts 
                                                                                                                          
142 See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69 (2006) (stating that the 
significance of a retaliatory act must be read in its context); Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 
456 (2006) (finding that the meaning of words depends on their context); Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998) (finding that courts must evaluate the context of an 
action to determine if it constitutes sexual harassment); see also Chamallas, supra note 1, at 1367–69 
(providing an overview of how the Supreme Court has permitted courts to use context to interpret what 
constitutes “reasonable”).  Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue directly, in Harris 
v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the Court defined an objectively hostile work environment as one that a 
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive. 510 U.S. at 21.  It declined to address the question of 
the validity of recently proposed EEOC regulations that specifically adopted both a reasonable person 
standard and a victim’s perspective standard.  Id. at 22–23 (citing 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266 (proposed 29 
C.F.R. 1609.19(c)) (1993)).  The proposed EEOC regulation which was later withdrawn stated, “The 
reasonable person standard includes consideration of the perspective of persons of the alleged victim’s 
race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability.” 59 Fed. Reg. 51,396 (proposed 29 
C.F.R. 1609.19(c)) (1993)).  
143 See infra notes 144–55 and accompanying text (illustrating the examples where the Supreme 
Court demonstrates such an approach). 
144 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
145 Id. at 81–82 (1998).  The football coach example may be an unfortunate one given the recent 
scandals in men’s sports at Penn State and Syracuse Universities.  E.g., Pete Thamel, Syracuse’s 
Boeheim Stands by Assistant Accused of Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2011, at B13; Mark Viera, A Sex 
Abuse Scandal Rattles Penn State’s Football Program, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2011, at A1. 
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performed.”146 It encourages courts and juries to use “[c]ommon sense and 
an appropriate sensitivity to social context” to distinguish between legal 
and illegal behavior.
147
   
In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,
 148
 the Court 
defines what behavior amounts to a sufficient adverse employment action 
to constitute retaliation.  Here again, the Court adopts a context-rich 
approach.  The Court announced that an adverse employment action exists 
if “a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action 
materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have 
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination.”149 The test is an objective one: how a reasonable person 
would react.  But, the Court notes that “[c]ontext matters,”150 and gives a 
number of examples to illustrate its point.  Those examples encourage the 
fact-finder to consider the subjective situations of the individual plaintiffs 
involved.  For example, the Court states that changing an employee’s work 
schedule “may make little difference to many workers, but may matter 
enormously to a young mother with school-age children.”151  It suggests 
that such a schedule change would be materially adverse to the young 
mother with children. This conclusion relies on the victim’s identity as 
well as the context of her situation at home.  
In a third recent case, Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
152
 the Supreme Court 
again emphasized the importance of context.  In Ash, the lower court had 
held as a matter of law that an Alabama employer’s use of the term “boy” 
denoted no discriminatory racial animus toward the two black men who 
were denied promotions.
153
  The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower 
court’s conclusion that use of the term “boy” alone, without the qualifier 
“black” or “white,” could never prove discriminatory animus and was 
insufficient evidence to go to the jury.
154
  The Supreme Court stated, “The 
speaker’s meaning may depend on various factors including context, 
inflection, tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage.”155  
These cases suggest that the Supreme Court would not only permit, but 
would also encourage a more nuanced approach to determining whether an 
alleged sexual harassment victim’s reaction to harassing behavior was 
reasonable.  One concern, however, is the Court’s statement that fact-
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finders should use their common sense to decide these cases.  While juries 
ordinarily use common sense to make decisions, use of common sense in 
an area where social gender norms are involved may lead to discriminatory 
results.  Social norms can lead to erroneous assumptions and 
misunderstandings concerning the motivations behind employees’s 
behaviors and the reactions they produce in other employees.  This may be 
particularly true where the person judged is a member of a less powerful or 
outsider group.
156
  Research shows that where men are subject to 
harassment, views vary as to its severity based on the identity of the 
harasser, the type of harassment, and the gender of the judge.  For 
example, psychological studies show that male participants generally 
perceive female-on-male sexual harassment as less harassing than male-on-
female sexual harassment.  Female participants, however, perceive both 
types of harassment to be equal.
157
  Moreover, studies show that male 
participants view different types of male-on-male harassment differently.
158
  
They consider negative, hostile harassing behaviors by men directed at 
other men less serious.
159
  These behaviors are coined “rejection-based” 
sexual harassment.
160
  In contrast, male participants find sexual advances 
by men toward other men more harassing and serious.
161
  These harassing 
behaviors are deemed “approach-based” male-on-male harassment.162 
Multidimensional masculinities theory’s instruction to use varying 
lenses to view the situation may aid in understanding the dynamics.  
Multidimensionality theory, like intersectionality theory, urges an anti-
essentialist look at identity and recognizes that multiple strands of our 
identity interact to form the person, and that additionally, the individual’s 
experiences vary as the context varies.
163
  Use of MMT should be explicit 
in the courtroom.  Judges should encourage juries to consider context, but 
warn them that their first response may be a discriminatory one.  Social 
gender norms are very strongly held and often invisible to those who 
believe in the norms.  The judge should permit expert testimony of social 
                                                                                                                          
156 See Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1132 (2008) 
(noting that many outsiders have learned that performing at work exactly as white men does not shield 
them from discrimination, and that outsiders are often penalized for the same minor deficiencies for 
which insiders receive no penalty because the outsiders are much more visible and are the object of 
stereotypes). 
157 See Roger C. Katz et al., Effects of Gender and Situation on the Perception of Sexual 
Harassment, 34 SEX ROLES 35, 38–40 (1996) (discussing the results of a statistical analysis on 
harassment ratings as a function of group and situation); Stockdale et al., supra note 136, at 164–65 
(discussing the results of a study on sexual harassment). 
158 Stockdale et al., supra note 136, at 164–65. 
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163 See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text (discussing and explaining MMT). 
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facts based on social science research specifically applied to the case so 
that the jury can make an informed decision.
164
 
Prospect Airport Services demonstrates the problem with using a 
“reasonable woman” or “reasonable man” standard.165  Both standards tend 
to rely on stereotypical views of how men and women should or would 
react in response to a potentially harassing environment.  The law, 
however, should not enforce a gender regime based on stereotypes by 
labeling particular male or female behavior “reasonable” based on how 
men and women conform to societal gender norms.  There is a wide array 
of reasonable reactions to the same behaviors in the workplaces.  While 
biological sex and gender may to some extent affect an employee’s 
reaction to behaviors in the workplace, other contextual factors such as 
organizational power, social power, workplace dynamics, and an 
individual victim’s vulnerabilities may determine whether the individual’s 
response is a reasonable one.  
Prospect Airport Services provides a good example.  A “typical” male 
coworker may not have been troubled by Sylvia Munoz’s behavior.166  
Even if most men may not have welcomed the behavior, it is not likely that 
they would have been intimidated by Sylvia Munoz’s advances.  If 
bothered by Sylvia’s advances, a “typical” man would likely have stopped 
the behavior by responding in a forceful manner.  Rudolpho Lamas, 
however, was unable successfully to rebuff Munoz’s advances.167  Even 
though he told Munoz to stop a number of times, she did not heed his 
plea.
168
 
Understanding the context of Lamas’s home life and the workplace 
dynamics at Prospect would help explain to the jury why Lamas reacted to 
Munoz’s advances as he did.  Lamas attributed his discomfort with 
Munoz’s behavior to his fundamentalist religion and his status as a recent 
widower.
169
  This information  alone explains in part why Munoz’s 
behavior was difficult for him, but issues surrounding Lamas’s identity and 
the context of the workplace dynamics could have been developed even 
further.  After Lamas refused to involve himself with Munoz, a number of 
coworkers began to pressure him to go out with Munoz and began to 
question his masculinity and his sexual orientation.
170
  His coworkers’ 
                                                                                                                          
164 Mitchell et al., supra note 139, at 1154–55 (explaining the benefits of expert witnesses 
carrying out empirical social research to support social facts). 
165 EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2010) (illustrating how the 
“reasonable man” standard relies on stereotypical views of men). 
166 See id. at 995 (discussing how Lamas's coworkers made remarks that he was gay because of 
his reaction to Munoz’s advances). 
167 Id. at 994. 
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169 Id. at 998. 
170 Id. at 995. 
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teasing and his supervisors’ reaction to Lamas may have resulted from 
beliefs that Lamas did not live up to masculine stereotypes.  In other 
words, they may have believed that Lamas should have handled the 
situation himself, accepted Munoz’s advances, or shut up because only 
non-masculine men complain about sexual harassment.  Another possible 
contextual reason for Munoz’s ability to harass Lamas is racial.  Lamas, a 
dark-skinned Latino male, may have had less power socially than Munoz, a 
light skinned Latina, and Munoz’s and others’ attitudes toward Lamas may 
have related in part to his color. 
Prospect Airport Services demonstrates that the problem with the 
standard lies in its conclusion that there is only one reasonable reaction to a 
set of harassing circumstances. The standard should not measure a 
“reasonable man” or a “reasonable woman” or even a “reasonable person.”  
Rather, it should consider the context of the situation, including identity 
factors of the victim, the fluid organizational and social power 
differentials, and the various personal vulnerabilities of the victims to 
determine whether the victim’s response in viewing the behavior as 
harassing was reasonable.  This should not be an onerous test.  Once the 
victim’s response is deemed potentially reasonable given the contextual 
and identity factors at play, the focus should be on the employer’s response 
to the behavior.  Here, again, Prospect Airport Services is instructive.  The 
fact-finder should consider not only that Lamas was a man, but also that he 
was a fundamentalist Christian who found Munoz’s behavior particularly 
threatening, and that he was a recent widower who was still mourning his 
wife’s death.  But an understanding of the facts in Prospect Airport 
Services reveals more.  It appears that the injury to Rudolpho Lamas 
occurred not only at the hands of his female coworker, Sylvia Munoz, but 
also as a result of his employer’s refusal to stop the behavior, combined 
with his fellow coworkers’ questioning of his failure to live up to their 
standards of masculinity. 
Courts have traditionally analyzed whether a hostile work environment 
exists before analyzing the separate question of whether the employer is 
liable for the environment, but in this case this approach was inadequate.  
In fact, the employer’s refusal to step in and stop both Munoz’s and the 
coworkers’ harassing behavior, and its attitude that Lamas should not take 
the behavior seriously actually enhanced the seriousness of the behavior.  
In essence, the employer’s behavior was an important part of the hostile 
work environment itself.  This behavior, therefore, is part and parcel of the 
context of the situation that the fact-finder should consider in determining 
whether Lamas’s working environment was hostile.  In this case, the fact-
finder should have considered the employer’s reaction in determining 
whether the behavior was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms 
or conditions of the employee’s employment.  Here, perhaps because the 
employer believed that sexual harassment by a female coworker on a male 
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coworker was less serious than the more common harassment by a male on 
a female coworker, the employer failed to act and even ridiculed Lamas’s 
reports of sexual harassment.  His supervisor told him that he should be 
singing, “I’m too sexy for my shirt,”171 and did not take Lamas’s report 
seriously.  This behavior, combined with the employer’s failure to stop the 
harassment by Munoz and by fellow coworkers who questioned Lamas’s 
sexual orientation, added to the severity and the pervasiveness of the 
problem.  
C.  Proposal:  A Reasonable Response 
1.  The Proposal 
In determining the proper objective standard for a hostile working 
environment, it is important to assure that we do not use men as a 
measuring stick of how a reasonable person would react, and that we do 
not engage in stereotyping when determining how men or women should 
or do react to a harassing environment.  To avoid these problems, the law 
should allow fact-finders to consider variations in the context of the 
workplace, it should take into account different lived experiences of the 
victims, and it should reflect on power differentials at work and in society.  
But, most importantly, a new standard should recognize that there is a 
range of reasonable responses to the same set of behaviors.  The standard, 
rather than considering what a reasonable person, reasonable woman, or 
reasonable victim would have thought, should look at whether the 
plaintiff’s response was a reasonable one, given a number of factors.  This 
test is a totality of the circumstances test.  It is important for judges and 
juries to understand that the factors listed below are not elements and that 
not all factors need be present for a hostile work environment to exist.   
In determining whether the plaintiff’s response was reasonable, there 
should be a two-part test, as there currently is.
172
  The first question, which 
goes to the subjective element, would remain the same: whether the 
behavior created a hostile work environment for the plaintiff as a 
subjective matter.
173
  If the answer to this question is yes, the second 
question is whether the plaintiff’s reaction was a reasonable one when 
taking into account the workplace dynamics, the harassing behaviors, and 
the plaintiff’s identity, experiences, and position at the workplace.174  
Under the law as it currently stands, when considering this second 
question, fact-finders focus only on the conduct itself.  They consider the 
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following:  
• Frequency of conduct; 
• Severity of conduct; 
• Whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating or a 
mere offensive utterance; and 
• Whether the conduct unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s 
work.
175
 
These are all important factors that help determine how serious or 
severe or pervasive the conduct is, but they disregard the context of the 
workplace, how power operates, and the victim’s identity and experiences.  
Under the new proposed standard, the fact-finder should also consider the 
following:  
• The personal identity of the plaintiff; 
• Circumstances at work or outside of work that make the alleged 
victim vulnerable; 
• Relative power of the harasser(s) based on position at work and/or 
social power; 
• Relative powerlessness of the harassee(s) based on position at 
work and/or lack of social power; 
• Whether the individual alleging harassment is a social outsider;  
• Workplace dynamics; and 
• Workplace context.  
This test has a number of advantages.  First, it is flexible enough to 
permit a uniform standard for all types of harassment, no matter who the 
perpetrators and the victims are, but also to allow consideration of variable 
factors in particular cases that go to whether an objectively hostile work 
environment existed.  The proposal has the benefit of retaining the 
objective test, but also permitting the consideration of important 
surrounding circumstances in determining whether a hostile working 
environment existed.  
2.  Will the Proposal Make a Difference?  
The final question is whether a “reasonable response” standard would 
make a difference.  Although there is no research on whether this new 
standard would affect a fact-finder’s determinations, we can learn 
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something from existing research on the reasonable woman standard.  
Psychological studies demonstrate that women judge harassing behaviors, 
at least those that are more ambiguous, as more severe or harassing than 
men do.
176
  The difference between women and men is small, but fairly 
consistent, and it does not exist where there is very extreme behavior.
177
  
This differential of perspective, along with men’s superior social and 
organizational power and the reality that women represent the vast 
majority of sexual harassment victims, led to the use of the reasonable 
woman standard in some courts.  But a question still remains as to whether 
the use of the reasonable woman standard actually affects the results.  
Research into whether the reasonable woman standard makes a difference 
to the outcome remains inconclusive.  A number of studies find that, when 
clearly instructed on the different standards, those applying a reasonable 
woman standard to a male-on-female harassment situation are slightly 
more likely to find that sexual harassment occurred.
178
     
But even these studies are not determinative.  A number of the studies 
use students as subjects;
179
 others use both students and adults;
180
 others 
study court opinions to evaluate the effect of the reasonable woman 
standard.
181
  But none of the studies accounts for all of the possible 
variables that could affect the results in a real case.  To evaluate these 
studies, we must consider the effect of pre-trial and post-trial motions 
decided by judges and the effect of deliberation on individual jurors’ 
decisions.  Judges faced with motions for summary judgment and for 
judgment as a matter of law regularly consider the standard and the facts to 
determine the sufficiency of the evidence.  Thus, the judge’s view of how 
the facts relate to the standard is very important to the result, and is often 
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determinative.  During trial, where the jury is the fact-finder, the verdict is 
not an individual determination, but rather the result of a group deliberative 
process.  When viewed in this light, we see that the empirical studies do 
not necessarily reflect how decisions would be made in a real case.  First, 
the psychological studies measure the standard only in male-on-female 
cases so, at most, they can predict how the reasonable woman standard 
affects the typical male-on-female harassment case.  Second, many of the 
studies use undergraduate students as test subjects, and offer them a very 
short description of the possible scenario.  These studies give the students a 
short description of the behavior and then instruct different groups of 
students to use the reasonable person and the reasonable woman standards.  
The individual students then rate whether they would find that the 
particular behavior created a hostile work environment.  The test 
subjects—individual undergraduate students—differ widely from both the 
judge and the jury.  Like the judge, the undergraduates act alone in making 
their determinations, but unlike the judge, they are not well informed about 
the law and have no experience with these types of cases.
182
  Like the jury, 
the students have little or no experience with the law, but, unlike a jury, the 
students are not diverse in age and personal experience and they make their 
own individual determinations without a deliberative process.  The 
undergraduate students’ responses, therefore, may not accurately reflect 
whether an individual judge would conclude that a particular scenario is 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment or 
whether a jury, after deliberation, would conclude that it is.
183
   
Other studies correct for some of these deficiencies by using both 
students and adults as participants, and different means of communicating 
the information to the test subjects.  These studies, which use videotapes 
and longer descriptions of cases that are taken from testimony in real cases, 
are much improved over earlier studies and yield important results.
184
  
Nonetheless, these studies still do not account for the role of the judge in 
the decision or the role of the jury’s deliberative process in decision 
making.  There are a few studies that consider judicial opinions to 
determine whether the reasonable woman standard makes a difference in 
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the cases,
185
 but these studies, too, have difficulty replicating the trial 
process.  The Perry study, for example, looks only at published decisions 
(including those published on Lexis-Nexis), does not consider any opinions 
decided on pre-trial motions, and looks only at federal district court cases 
where the judges served as fact-finders at trial.
186
  The Juliano-Schwab 
study is broader in that it looks at both federal district court and federal 
court of appeals opinions,
187
 and does not exclude opinions written in 
response to pre-trial motions, but it does not control for the severity or 
pervasiveness of the behavior.  Both studies of judicial opinions 
necessarily omit the vast majority of cases that are resolved without filing a 
claim, or are settled without a judicial opinion.
188
  Moreover, in both 
studies of judicial opinions, it is difficult to tell whether the reasonable 
woman standard causes the positive effect or whether the circuits using the 
reasonable woman standard are more liberal in their approach to sexual 
harassment cases.   
Given this research and the lack of research on my proposed standard, 
it is unclear whether a new “reasonable response” standard would have a 
significant effect on the results in sexual harassment cases.  At the very 
least, however, the new approach should provide a corrective effect on the 
judges.  Because the new standard emphasizes that there are numerous 
reasonable responses, it will take the focus off of the reasonableness of the 
particular victim’s reaction, and place it more on the employer’s response.  
Moreover, because it encourages a more contextualized approach, it would 
encourage judges to use humility in relying on their own “common sense” 
and would lead to admission of expert testimony providing social facts 
testimony.  Furthermore, it should encourage employers who are creating 
policies to understand that their policies should anticipate that there is 
more than one reasonable response to a particular set of behaviors.  Finally, 
it will provide an opportunity for further research into a more complex 
understanding of how judges and juries interact and how those interactions 
affect results in the context of a hostile work environment claim.     
IV.  CONCLUSION: FROM “THE MAN QUESTION” TO “THE WOMAN 
QUESTION” 189 
Prospect Airport Services, combined with an understanding of MMT, 
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permits us to reconsider both the underlying theory of sex discrimination in 
a hostile work environment case and the proper standard for determining 
whether a hostile work environment exists.  Using MMT to shift the lens in 
sexual harassment cases encourages development of a better theory to 
support Title VII sexual harassment law, regardless of the sex of the 
perpetrator and victim.  Essential to a theory of illegal sex discrimination 
in a hostile work environment case is the use of organizational and/or 
social power to create a sexually hostile or gender-hostile environment.  A 
multidimensional masculinities approach permits development of a new, 
more universal standard to determine objective and subjective 
reasonableness, a standard that takes into account gender, race, and other 
identity characteristics of the victim, and the victim’s personal 
vulnerabilities in the context of organizational and social power.  The fact-
finder should also consider the employer’s response to the victim’s 
complaints in determining whether a hostile work environment existed 
because of the plaintiff’s sex.  Clearly, the employer’s response plays an 
important role in the implementation of organizational power to the ends of 
creating a hostile work environment. 
But this case tells us even more.  After shifting the lens to ask “the 
man question” we need once more to shift back to examine the woman 
question.  That is, masculinities theory is particularly useful in helping us 
to understand our blind spots.  It permits us to consider varying 
possibilities where vulnerable men receive unequal treatment.  It also 
allows us to consider why groups of men (or men and women) may engage 
in behavior that scapegoats less masculine men.   
Shifting the lens and applying a multidimensional view helps us to 
understand why women are still subject to serious workplace harassment.  
If men and/or women cannot tolerate a workforce where some men are not 
masculine in the traditional sense, there will be no room in those jobs for 
women as equals either.  Worshipping hegemonic forms of masculinity has 
a flip side: besides harming men who do not live up to the ideal, 
worshiping masculinity denigrates working women.
190
 
 
                                                                                                                          
190 Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate 
Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 18 (1995) (stating that characteristics 
that are seen as masculine are more highly valued and that characteristics seen as feminine are devalued 
and are unacceptable in males). 
 40 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1 
 
